Cloud
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Business continuity and disaster recovery is the work of deciding what must survive, how quickly it must return, and proving that it does. It spans impact analysis, RPO and RTO targets agreed with the business, failover design, runbooks and exercises.
The recurring failure is a plan built around infrastructure rather than around services. Everything is replicated, and at the exercise it emerges that the order of return was never established, the DNS change needs someone who has left, and the recovery environment cannot carry full production load. Recovery is a sequence, and untested sequences do not hold.
If more than one of these is true, this is usually the right place to start.
| Deliverable | What it contains |
|---|---|
| Impact analysis | Services ranked by consequence of loss, each with the dependency chain that has to come back before it can. |
| Recovery targets | RPO and RTO per service, costed and signed off by the business owner, so any gap is accepted knowingly. |
| Failover runbooks | Step-by-step recovery per service, naming roles rather than individuals, with the decision points marked. |
| Exercise report | What was tested, what took longer than target, and the remediation items with owners and dates against them. |
A reference, not a template. Your estate decides which parts apply and in what order they arrive.
Targets are agreed with you before the work starts, and reported against for its duration.
A realistic pattern is a desktop walkthrough a few times a year and a technical failover at least annually, with any service that changed materially tested after the change. Frequency matters less than honesty. An exercise designed to succeed teaches you nothing; the useful ones surface a broken step.
Those are business decisions with a price attached, not technical defaults. Near-zero data loss and minutes of downtime are achievable and cost accordingly. Four hours costs a fraction of that. The workable method is to state what each level costs, let the service owner choose, and then design to the choice.
Backup is one part of recovery and the part most often mistaken for all of it. A backup tells you the data still exists. It does not tell you how long a restore takes, whether the target environment exists, or in what order services must return. Untested restores are the most common gap we find.
Not by itself, and assuming otherwise is dangerous, because replication faithfully copies encrypted data to the secondary site. That case needs immutable or otherwise isolated copies, with a retention window longer than the time it typically takes to notice an intrusion. It is a different design from availability replication, and both are usually needed.
That is precisely the question an exercise answers, and the answer is often at reduced capacity. A secondary sized for a subset of load is a legitimate choice when it is a stated one, because then the plan says which services get shed. The problem is a secondary assumed to be equal that has never carried full load.
A named role, with the authority written down in advance and a deputy for when that person is unreachable. The expensive delays in real incidents are usually decision delays rather than technical ones. The plan should also state what evidence triggers the call, so the threshold is not being invented while the clock runs.
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Application inventory, landing zone design and wave-based cutover for moving workloads to AWS, Azure or GCP with dependencies mapped before the window.
Landing zone, private connectivity and one identity and policy model spanning on-premises and cloud, so workload placement becomes a decision.
The fastest way to a useful answer is a short, scoped look at what you already have.