Cybersecurity
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Control the configuration, the identities and the workloads — in that order.
Cloud security is mostly a configuration and identity problem. Breaches in cloud estates rarely begin with an exploited platform; they begin with a storage bucket left open, a role granted more than it needed, or a key committed to a repository. This capability covers posture management, entitlements, workload protection and the audit trail that makes any of it provable.
The distinction that matters is between finding misconfiguration and preventing it. Scanning production tells you what is already wrong. Scanning infrastructure-as-code in the pipeline stops it being deployed. We build toward the second while the first keeps the lights on.
If more than one of these is true, this is usually the right place to start.
| Deliverable | What it contains |
|---|---|
| Posture baseline | The standard applied, per-account deviation, and a remediation order driven by exploitability rather than count. |
| Entitlement review | Effective permissions per identity, over-privilege highlighted, and a least-privilege target with a path to it. |
| Pipeline controls | IaC and image scanning wired into your CI, with the policy that decides what fails a build and who can override it. |
| Evidence pack | Control-to-requirement mapping and where each piece of evidence is produced — so the next audit is a query, not a project. |
A reference, not a template. Your estate decides which parts apply and in what order they arrive.
Targets are agreed with you before the work starts, and reported against for its duration.
For the platform, yes. Under every major provider's shared responsibility model, configuration, identity and data are yours. The provider will keep the storage service running; it will not stop you making a bucket public.
It changes tooling and terminology, not the principles. The main risk in a multi-cloud estate is a baseline that exists properly in one provider and vestigially in the others, so the standard is defined once and then expressed per provider.
Native tooling covers a useful amount, particularly in a single-provider estate, and it is worth exhausting before buying. A dedicated platform earns its cost when you need one view across providers or capability the native tools lack.
They are in scope. Image scanning before deployment, admission control at the cluster boundary, and runtime policy inside it — with the caveat that runtime enforcement needs tuning or it will be turned off within a month.
The controls are the same; the difference is evidence. Building the evidence trail while the control is implemented costs very little. Reconstructing it a year later for an audit costs a great deal, which is why the evidence pack is a deliverable rather than an afterthought.
Yes, and the sequencing matters more than the fixing. A first scan of an untended estate produces hundreds of findings, most of which do not matter. We order remediation by what is actually reachable and exploitable, not by the tool's severity column.
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Single sign-on, multi-factor authentication, privileged access and joiner-mover-leaver — built so access is granted deliberately and removed automatically.
Classification, encryption, key management and data loss prevention — starting from where your data actually is, not where the policy says it should be.
The fastest way to a useful answer is a short, scoped look at what you already have.