Infrastructure
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
A backup you have not restored is an assumption.
This covers backup design, retention, immutability and offsite copies, together with the disaster recovery design that decides how a service comes back and how quickly. The two are separate: backup protects data, disaster recovery restores a service.
Almost every estate has backups. Far fewer have evidence of a restore under time pressure, and fewer still have backups an attacker cannot reach — which matters, because deleting or encrypting backups is now a standard step in a ransomware attack rather than an unusual one.
If more than one of these is true, this is usually the right place to start.
| Deliverable | What it contains |
|---|---|
| Recovery objectives | RPO and RTO per service, signed off by the business, with the cost of each level made visible. |
| Backup design | Scope, schedule, retention, copy topology and immutability, mapped to the objectives above. |
| Recovery runbooks | Per scenario, in dependency order, written to be followed by someone who did not design the system. |
| Test results | Restore and failover tests with measured times against target, and remediation for anything that missed. |
A reference, not a template. Your estate decides which parts apply and in what order they arrive.
Targets are agreed with you before the work starts, and reported against for its duration.
RPO is how much data you can afford to lose, which sets backup frequency. RTO is how long a service may be down, which sets the recovery design. They are separate decisions and cost different money; conflating them is why recovery plans miss.
Because ransomware now targets backups first. If backup storage can be deleted or encrypted with credentials the attacker already holds, it will be. Immutable copies cannot be altered for a defined window, which is what preserves the option to refuse to pay.
No. Replication copies the current state, including corruption and encryption, usually within minutes. It protects against hardware and site failure. It does not protect against something bad happening to the data, which is what backup retention is for.
Critical services at least annually end to end, and more often for anything that has changed. Partial tests — a file, a single machine — are useful but they do not prove a service comes back, because the difficulty is usually in dependency order.
It changes where copies live, not whether the design is right. Cloud backup still needs retention, immutability, tested restores and an egress cost you have looked at before the day you need the data back quickly.
It is the most common gap. Providers protect their platform; the retention of your data within it is usually limited, and deleted or maliciously altered content often falls outside it. SaaS data is treated as in scope unless a deliberate decision says otherwise.
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Sizing, refresh and storage design driven by measured workload rather than by a vendor configurator — including what happens when a component fails.
Hypervisor cluster design, resource policy and right-sizing — including the licensing consequence of the design, which is where surprises usually arrive.
The fastest way to a useful answer is a short, scoped look at what you already have.